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INTRODUCTION 
“In Supreme Court Ruling, Drugmakers Win and Consumers Lose.”1 In 
June 2013, headlines around the country proclaimed their disbelief when the 
United State Supreme Court stripped a woman of a $21 million jury award she 
received for being burned, blinded, and permanently disfigured after ingesting a 
generic prescription drug.2 The woman, Karen Bartlett, was diagnosed with 
Stevens Johnson syndrome (SJS) and toxic epidermal necrolysis (TEN),3 after 
                                                        
1  Ed Silverman, In Supreme Court Ruling, Drugmakers Win and Consumers Lose, FORBES 
(June 24, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/edsilverman/2013/06/24/in-supreme-
court-ruling-drugmakers-win-and-consumers-lose/#721804473770 [https://perma.cc/W5W 
G-9AXD]. 
2  Katie Moisse, Woman Disfigured by Generic Drug Loses $21 Million Award, ABC NEWS 
(June 29, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/woman-disfigured-generic-drug-loses-21-mil 
lion-award/story?id=19520506 [https://perma.cc/A687-5Z5L]. 
3  “Stevens Johnson syndrome (SJS) and toxic epidermal necrolysis (TEN) are [severe reac-
tions to prescription drugs] characterized by peeling of skin along with hemorrhagic crusting 
of lips and erosions of oral and genital mucosa.” G. K. Singh et al., Cyclosporine in Stevens 
Johnson Syndrome and Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis and Retrospective Comparison with Sys-
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ingesting a generic prescription drug for shoulder pain.4 However, if Ms. Bart-
lett had taken the brand-name version of her prescription, the verdict would 
have been upheld. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mutual Pharmaceutical 
Co. v. Bartlett, reporters and consumers began to demand that the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alter its regulations in order to make ge-
neric drug companies liable for any injuries their products cause.5 The question 
left unanswered was how it could be possible for companies to make products 
but not be responsible when those products hurt innocent consumers. 
This article examines the evolution of product liability for pharmaceutical 
drug manufacturers, as well as proposed regulations and the current effects of 
the United States (U.S.) health care system on consumer rights. Part I discusses 
the background of the FDA and the agency’s current rules for gaining approval 
to bring prescription drugs to market. Part II reviews landmark legislation in 
the field of products liability, including the recent decisions, which stripped 
consumers of a remedy for side effects suffered after ingesting generic drugs. 
Finally, Part III discusses current proposed regulations that would make generic 
drug manufacturers independently responsible for the safety of their products. 
I.   BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND RULES 
FOR GAINING APPROVAL TO MARKET PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the 
public health by ensuring the safety and efficacy of all food, drugs, medical de-
vices, and other medical products.6 In the field of pharmaceutical drug manu-
facturing, the FDA has issued strict guidelines which require manufacturers 
seeking to gain market approval for new pharmaceutical drugs to demonstrate 
that the “drug is safe for use and . . . effective,”7 and that the benefits outweigh 
the risks.8 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the FDA has enacted numerous 
regulations to achieve the goal of ensuring the safety of prescription drugs. 
However, the FDA has different requirements for granting market approval of 
brand-name drugs than it does for generic equivalents. 
                                                                                                                                 
temic Corticosteroid, 79 INDIAN J. DERMATOLOGY, VENEREOLOGY, & LEPROLOGY 686, 686 
(2013). The mortality rate is around “5% for SJS and 30% for TEN.” Id. 
4  Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2013). 
5  See, e.g., Editorial, A Damaging Decision on Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/29/opinion/a-damaging-decision-on-generic-drugs.html 
[https://perma.cc/HW3Q-YB68]. 
6  What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Y6M-JQ9H] (last updated Oct. 24, 2016). 
7  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012). 
8  Id. § 355(d). 
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A.   Creating the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
The modern day Food and Drug Administration began in 1862 when Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln appointed a single chemist to serve in the newly-formed 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Division of Chemistry.9 The Division of 
Chemistry was responsible for overseeing and investigating the purity and safe-
ty of ingredients in the nation’s foods and drugs.10 The Division of Chemistry 
changed its name to the Bureau of Chemistry (the Bureau) with passage of the 
Pure Food and Drugs Act in 1906, and finally received the name “United States 
Food and Drug Administration” in July 1930.11 
1.   The Pure Food and Drug Act 
In 1880, Peter Collier, a chemist for the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
recommended a national food and drug law, but it was rejected by Congress.12 
Afterwards, several other bills were introduced to Congress to regulate food 
and drugs, but only one, the Meat Inspection Act of 1891, passed before the 
Pure Food and Drug Act.13 In 1906, the Pure Food and Drug Act was signed 
into law,14 adding a regulatory function to the Bureau’s list of responsibilities.15 
Initially, the Bureau was charged with regulating the interstate transportation of 
food and drugs, focusing primarily on regulating product labels.16 Under the 
new regulations, manufacturers had to list the product ingredients and refrain 
from labeling products in a way that was false or could mislead consumers.17 
For example, drugs could be sold only in accordance with the standards set 
forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia and the National Formulary unless 
the specific variations were “plainly stated on the label.”18 In contrast, foods 
                                                        
9  Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2FBF-9R9X] (last updated Dec. 19, 2014). 
10  John P. Swann, FDA’s Origin, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/About 
FDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403.htm [https://perma.cc/KM8Z-EBWQ] (last 
updated June 23, 2014). 
11  Charles Warren, When the Feds Have Taken the Field: Federal Field Preemption of 
Claims Against Manufacturers Whose Medical Devices Have Received Premarket Approval 
by the FDA, 9 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 65, at 7 (2013), https://www.law.ou.edu/sites/default/ 
files/files/FACULTY/warren%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JZS-9KUE]. 
12  Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra note 9. 
13  Thomas F. McGuire, Note, Food, Drug or Both?: Dual Classification Under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 987, 990 & n.19 (1984). 
14  Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938). 
15  Swann, supra note 10. 
16  Priya Brandes, Comment, Regulation of Drugs: A Death Sentence for the Terminally Ill?, 
46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2012). 
17  McGuire, supra note 13, at 991. 
18  FDA History—Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ME4F-E7PK] (last updated June 18, 2009). 
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were not subject to “analogous standards, but the law prohibited the addition of 
any ingredients” that would constitute a food substitute or could pose a health 
hazard.19 Congress’s intent was for consumers to be able to ascertain from the 
label a product’s ingredients and its intended use.20 
2.   The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
Public concern over the lack of product testing for safety and efficacy prior 
to introduction to the market led to the 1938 passage of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), thus replacing the Pure Food and Drug Act.21 The 
FDCA created new requirements for a drug to gain pre-market approval, in-
cluding proof of the drug’s safety and inclusion of directions for safe use on the 
drug’s label.22 The FDCA also increased the FDA’s ability to ensure quality 
manufacturing processes by allowing the FDA to perform factory inspections.23 
3.   Notable Amendments to the FDCA 
The Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951 created the requirement that 
certain drugs be dispensed only by prescription.24 The main reason behind this 
new requirement was that the usage of these drugs, without thorough explana-
tion of their labels, posed the potential for harm to consumers.25 The Durham-
Humphrey Amendment, therefore, ensured that a physician would inform the 
patient of the risks and benefits of the prescription-only drugs.26 
The Kefauver-Harris Amendment of 1962 included new requirements, 
which mandated that drug manufacturers prove their products were both safe 
and effective.27 Furthermore, manufacturers were now required to report to the 
FDA any adverse side effects discovered after a drug was approved and intro-
duced on the market.28 Most notably, the amendments required express FDA 
approval before a drug could enter the market.29 Previously, manufacturers 
could introduce a drug to the market provided that the FDA had not objected 
                                                        
19  Id. 
20  See id. 
21  Brandes, supra note 16, at 1149, 1152. 
22  Id. at 1152. 
23  21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(1) (2012). 
24  Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-215, sec. 1, § 503(b), 65 Stat. 
648, 648–49 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 352–355 (2012)). 
25  See FDA History—Part III: Drugs and Foods Under the 1938 Act and Its Amendments, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/uc 
m055118.htm [https://perma.cc/Q92K-G9KW] (last updated June 18, 2009). 
26  Durham-Humphrey Amendment, sec. 1, § 503(b), 65 Stat. at 648–49. 
27  See Kefauver-Harris Amendment of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780; see also 
Brandes, supra note 16, at 1152–53. 
28  21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(4)(D)(i)(II)(bb) (amended 2016). 
29  Id. § 355(a). 
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within sixty days of the manufacturer first seeking approval.30 After the adop-
tion of the Amendments of 1962, a drug manufacturer had to conduct pre-
marketing trials to prove the safety and efficacy of its drugs, present its findings 
to the FDA, and wait for the FDA to review and affirmatively approve those 
findings before bringing a new drug to market.31 All manufacturers seeking to 
market a generic drug not only had to conduct pre-marketing trials to prove that 
their versions of the product were safe and effective, they also had to wait until 
the expiration of the original patent on the brand-name drug before marketing 
their drug.32 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(Hatch-Waxman Act) eliminated the requirement for generic drug manufactur-
ers to independently prove drug safety and efficacy,33 instead requiring them 
only to prove bioequivalency to a previously approved brand-name drug.34 
Most recently, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 required manufacturers to immediately implement changes to drug labels 
without waiting for FDA approval.35 Previously, when drug manufacturers 
learned new safety information after a drug had already received FDA approv-
al, the FDA had to review any proposed label changes before the manufacturer 
could update the label.36 This meant that manufacturers were responsible for 
warning consumers of risks discovered by new data or by new analysis of old 
data.  
                                                        
30  See Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History//ucm304485.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5R8U-EFRN] (last updated Apr. 11, 2016). 
31  Id.; see also Chris Woolston, History of Generic Drugs, HEALTHDAY, http://consum 
er.healthday.com/encyclopedia/drug-center-16/misc-drugs-news-218/history-of-generic-drug 
s-646390.html [https://perma.cc/XMF5-VKZZ] (last updated Jan. 20, 2017). 
32  Woolston, supra note 31. 
33  See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. The Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to strike a balance between 
providing consumers with low-cost generic drugs while also providing brand-name manufac-
turers with time to recoup their investment costs from developing innovative drugs. See The 
FTC Study on Barriers to Entry in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On the Judiciary 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tr 
oy%20Testimony%20061703.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCV8-SN5P]. Among its key provisions 
was the creation of an abbreviated drug approval process for generic drugs, lessening the 
expense and time necessary to bring generic drugs to market. Id. 
34  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at xii (1998). 
35  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 
823; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009). 
36  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567. 
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B.   Brand Name Manufacturer Requirements for Drug Approval 
The FDCA requires a new drug application be approved by the FDA before 
a manufacturer may introduce the drug into interstate commerce.37 The drug 
application content requirements are listed in the FDCA and include reporting 
the safety and the effectiveness of the drug, a listing of the drug components, 
and proposed labeling for the drug.38 The applicant, or manufacturer, is referred 
to as a “new drug application (NDA) holder.”39  
 However, a pioneer, or brand-name, drug manufacturer may have to com-
plete additional steps before submitting an NDA for FDA approval.40 The pro-
cess often begins with an Investigational New Drug Application, reporting the 
early results of animal testing, and a proposal for human testing.41  
 Once the FDA determines it is reasonably safe to begin human trials, the 
manufacturer begins testing the product on healthy volunteers to learn the 
drug’s most frequent side effects.42 The manufacturer may then conduct addi-
tional tests to determine if the drug performs as intended on patients suffering 
from the targeted medical conditions.43 This includes comparing the drug’s ef-
ficacy with a placebo drug and evaluating short-term side effects.44 The FDA 
and the manufacturer then determine if large-scale testing should occur, where 
the drug will be tested on patients with other illnesses and in combination with 
other drugs.45 Once all clinical trials have concluded, the manufacturer submits 
its NDA for FDA approval.46 Only an average of one in five new drugs to sur-
vive this process makes it to market.47 
1.   Period of Exclusivity for Brand-Name Drugs 
Clinical trials can be both expensive and time-consuming. It can cost up-
wards of $1.3 billion and take an average of twelve years to obtain market ap-
                                                        
37  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
38  Id. § 355(b)(1). 
39  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biolog-
ical Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
314, 601). 
40  See generally FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/BioterrorismandDrugPreparedness/ucm1
34444.htm [https://perma.cc/GW6F-G3VP] (last updated Aug. 21, 2015). 
41  The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm [http 
s://perma.cc/S73P-2YS7] (last updated Nov. 6, 2014). 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Jane Larkindale, Why Does it Take so Long to Go From Mouse to Man?, QUEST (Jan. 1, 
2012, 3:11 PM), http://quest.mda.org/article/why-does-it-take-so-long-go-mouse-man [http 
s://perma.cc/E6XS-XV54]. 
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proval for one new drug.48 “To balance the interests of generic drug manufac-
turers and those of [brand-name] drug manufacturers, Congress provided 
[brand-name manufacturers] with varying periods of exclusivity prior to FDA 
approval of a competing generic drug.”49 Exclusivity periods prohibit generic 
versions of new drugs from gaining FDA approval within a certain period of 
time from the brand-name drug’s NDA approval.50 These periods vary 
depending on the type of drug and the year the drug was approved.51 These pe-
riods of exclusivity serve to reward manufacturers of pioneer drugs “while pro-
tecting consumers from . . . high prices by refusing to give a long period of 
market exclusivity to drugs which required no new research effort.”52 This pe-
riod of exclusivity gives brand-name drug manufacturers the exclusive right to 
market and sell their product before competing companies can sell generic 
equivalents, allowing brand name manufacturers to recover some of the costs 
expended in their initial research and development efforts before facing compe-
tition from less expensive generics.  
2.   Labeling Revisions for Brand-Name Drugs 
When a manufacturer learns new information about its drug, such as an in-
creased risk of an adverse reaction, it must update the drug’s label to reflect 
that new information.53 In the absence of these revisions, the drug may be 
“misbranded” due to false or misleading labeling.54 The FDA explicitly prohib-
its the manufacture or sale of misbranded drugs, meaning that a failure to up-
date a drug’s label can lead to a revocation of FDA approval to sell the drug.55 
Generally, in order for a manufacturer to change its label, it must once 
again obtain FDA approval.56 However, in limited circumstances, manufactur-
ers may implement label changes simultaneously with asking the FDA for per-
                                                        
48  Id.; see also Avik Roy, How the FDA Stifles New Cures, Part I: The Rising Cost of Clini-
cal Trials, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/04/24/ 
how-the-fda-stifles-new-cures-part-i-the-rising-cost-of-clinical-trials/ [https://perma.cc/9YF 
R-6ZD3]. 
49  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 923 F. Supp. 212, 221–22 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing 
Mead Johnson Pharm. Grp. v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1332, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
50  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E) (2012). 
51  Id. 
52  Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
53  See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70, 314.97, 601.12 (2016). 
54  See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (amended 2016). 
55  See id. § 331(a), (b). 
56  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b); see also id. § 601.12(f)(1). 
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mission for their implementation.57 These changes are referred to as “CBE-0 
supplements,” or “changes being effected supplements.”58 
C.   Generic Drug Manufacturers Requirements for Drug Approval 
Generic drugs come in three general categories: (1) “Pharmaceutical 
Equivalents,” which contain the same active ingredients and dosage form of a 
brand-name drug; (2) “Pharmaceutical Alternatives,” which contain the same 
therapeutic components, but a different dosage of a brand-name drug; and (3) 
“Therapeutic Equivalents,” pharmaceutical equivalents that are “expected to 
have the same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to patients” 
as brand-name drugs.59 
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act (“the Act”) revolutionized the pharmaceu-
tical industry by allowing manufacturers to submit abbreviated drug applica-
tions, thus shortening the time for FDA approval and introduction into the mar-
ket.60 Furthermore, the Act provided a ten-year period of exclusivity for drugs 
containing an active ingredient that had been approved between January 1, 
1982 and September 24, 1984,61 and a seven-and-one-half year period of exclu-
sivity for those approved after September 24, 1984.62  
Shortly after the implementation of the abbreviated processes, brand-name 
drug manufacturers began to experience increased competition by generic 
equivalents.63 The new processes allowed generic drugs to be introduced onto 
the market only three months after the expiration of the name-brand drug’s ex-
clusivity period, which had previously taken an average of three years.64 
1.   Gaining Market Approval for Generic Drugs 
The FDA considers a generic manufacturer an “abbreviated new drug [ap-
plicant],”65 and requires it to submit an “abbreviated new drug application[]” 
(“ANDA”) in order to gain FDA approval to market a generic version of a pre-
                                                        
57  See id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (to add or strengthen an instruction or warning, contraindi-
cation, or adverse reaction); id. § 601.12(f)(2). 
58  See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bi-
ological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,987 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601). 
59  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at vii (36th ed. 2016). 
60  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585. 
61  See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(E)(i) (2012). 
62  See id. § 355 (j)(5)(F)(ii). 
63  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 34, at xii. 
64  Id. 
65  See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bi-
ological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601). 
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scription drug.66 The requirements for an ANDA include proof of prior approv-
al of the brand-name drug equivalent, proof of identical active ingredients and 
dosage to that of the brand-name drug, and proof that the label will mirror the 
brand-name drug’s approved label.67 
2.   Period of Exclusivity for Generic Drugs 
Although generic drug manufacturers must wait until the expiration of the 
period of exclusivity for the brand-name drug before submitting an ANDA to 
market an equivalent drug, the generic drug manufacturer who submits the first 
ANDA gains its own period of exclusivity for 180 days, meaning that no other 
generic drug manufacturers may market their versions of the drug until after 
that first generic drug manufacturer has had the exclusive opportunity to do so 
for 180 days.68 There are a few exceptions to this 180-day period of exclusivity, 
such as when the manufacturer seeking to market a second generic form of a 
drug is the brand name manufacturer of that drug.69 
3.   Labeling Revisions for Generic Drugs 
As previously discussed, generic drugs can gain FDA market approval only 
if their labels exactly match those of their brand-name equivalent drugs.70 This 
requirement is subject to certain limited exceptions, such as differences in 
manufacturer names.71 In contrast to a brand name manufacturer’s ability to re-
vise drug labels to reflect new information, generic drug manufacturers are re-
quired to maintain labels that mirror that of the brand-name drug throughout the 
product’s lifetime.72 If at any time the labeling for the generic drug is “no long-
er consistent with that for the [brand-name drug equivalent],” the FDA may 
withdraw approval of the generic drug.73  
However, “[i]f an ANDA applicant believes new safety information should 
be added to a product’s labeling, it should contact [the] FDA, and [the] FDA 
                                                        
66  21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
67  See id. § 355(j)(2). 
68  See id. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv). 
69  Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
70  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585; see also Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 
17,950-01, 17,953 (proposed Apr. 28, 1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 
314, 320, 433). 
71  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 98 Stat. at 1585; see also 
Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,953. 
72  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (2016); see also Supplemental Applications Proposing 
Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,988 
(proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601). 
73  21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10). 
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will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be 
revised.”74 
D.   Prevalence of Generic Drugs in the Market 
As more brand-name drugs lose their period of exclusivity, an increasing 
number of generic drugs become available to consumers. In 1983, just before 
the Act was passed, “only 35 percent of the top-selling drugs with expired pa-
tents . . . had generic versions available.”75 In the years since the Act, however, 
the opposite trend began to emerge–the percentage of brand-name drugs being 
dispensed in comparison to generic drugs shrunk dramatically.76 In 1995, 59.8 
percent of all drugs dispensed were name brands, while generics accounted for 
only 40.2 percent.77 By 2010, brand-name drugs accounted for only 28.8 per-
cent of all drugs dispensed, with generics leading the way with 71.2 percent of 
all sales.78 
Paradoxically, although generic drugs control a larger share of the pharma-
ceutical market, the disparity in prices between brand-name and generic drugs 
is decreasing. In other words, although generic drugs are still less expensive, 
they no longer save consumers as much money as they did in the past. For ex-
ample, in 1995, the price difference between a generic drug and a brand-name 
drug was 36.89 percent, but in 2010, that difference shrunk to 26.49 percent.79 
Furthermore, despite the increased prevalence of generic drugs on the mar-
ket, some consumers remain dubious about their safety.80 Consumers are not 
alone: even in the medical community, physicians have reported skepticism 
about the quality and efficacy of generic medications.81 However, the FDA 
maintains that “[h]ealth care professionals and consumers can be assured that 
FDA approved generic drug products have met the same rigid standards as the 
[brand-name] drug.”82 Although generic drugs may be as safe as their brand 
name counterparts, there is a large disparity in their treatment within the U.S. 
legal system. 
                                                        
74  Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,961. 
75  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 34, at xii. 
76  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 113 
(131st ed. 2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/health.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/E5D6-JDFP]. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  What Are Generic Drugs and Are They Safe?, CONSUMER REPS. (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/08/are-generic-drugs-safe/index.htm [https://perm 
a.cc/T9DX-PF9T]. 
81  William H. Shrank et al., Physician Perceptions About Generic Drugs, 45 ANNALS 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 31, 34 (2011). 
82  Understanding Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Re 
sourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/defau
lt.htm [https://perma.cc/V88H-S2P8] (last updated Oct. 17, 2016). 
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II.   LANDMARK LEGISLATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
There are three main theories which establish manufacturer liability in U.S. 
courts: manufacturing defect, defective design, and inadequate warnings.83 
However, two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have essentially led to 
completely exempting generic drug manufacturers from liability for injuries 
caused by their products. 
A.   Establishing Strict Products Liability for Drug Manufacturers  
In the legal community, the terms “product liability” and “strict liability” 
are frequently combined to create the phrase “strict products liability.” In a tort 
claim, strict liability means that “it is immaterial whether the manufacturer was 
negligent in creating the design or exercised all reasonable care in the creation 
of the design. If a defect appears in the product in spite of all reasonable care 
exercised by the manufacturer, he is liable just the same.”84 Said another way, 
strict products liability is imposed in order to “relieve the plaintiff of the burden 
of proving that the defect in design or manufacture resulted from the negligence 
of the defendant.”85 
Certain products are “inherently dangerous” because “the danger of injury 
stems from the product itself . . . .”86 Some products found to be inherently 
dangerous include furniture polish,87 pesticides,88 “highly toxic materials, se-
cond hand guns[,] and [illegal] drugs.”89 Establishing liability for injuries aris-
ing out of the use of such inherently dangerous products is difficult because 
these products present obvious risks to the consumer. For these products, “[t]he 
obviousness of a danger and adequacy of a [manufacturer’s] warning are de-
termined by a ‘reasonable person’ standard, rather than [an individual] plain-
tiff’s subjective appreciation of the danger.”90 For example, it would be diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to bring a claim for being cut by a saw, because the saw itself 
is obviously dangerous due to its sharp teeth and it was designed to cut through 
things.91 
Unlike products whose risks may seem obvious, there are others which 
pose dangers that may not be as apparent. Therefore, when a product is not in-
                                                        
83  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
84  Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 262 (R.I. 1971). 
85  Id. 
86  Gen. Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 122 S.E.2d 548, 551 (Va. 1961). 
87  Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83, 84 (4th Cir. 1962). 
88  Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 1965). 
89  O’Connor v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1538, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
90  Byrnes v. Honda Motor Co., 887 F. Supp. 279, 281 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 
91  See Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 102 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting “the dangerous 
nature” of a commercial table saw). 
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herently dangerous, a manufacturer may still have a duty to warn about known 
dangers that might not be immediately apparent to consumers.92 
1.   Liability for Products Which Are Not “Inherently Dangerous”93 
Many claims for products liability arise out of negligence on the part of the 
product’s manufacturer. The traditional elements necessary to prove a claim for 
negligence include duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages.94 Generally, a 
manufacturer has a duty to consumers to “exercise reasonable care in designing 
and manufacturing” a product.95 Furthermore, manufacturers have a duty to 
warn consumers upon becoming aware of a defect in a product.96 Prior to 1916, 
courts primarily considered negligence claims for inherently dangerous prod-
ucts, such as poisons and explosives.97 
However, in 1916, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. became one of the first 
cases to apply negligence to products liability for products that were not inher-
ently dangerous.98 In MacPherson, the plaintiff was thrown from a vehicle after 
it collapsed due to a defective wheel, which had been installed by the vehicle 
manufacturer.99 There, the court explained that the manufacturer (Buick Motor 
Co.) had a strict duty to inspect the finished product to ensure that it was not 
negligently made, thus imposing a new duty on manufacturers to ensure safety, 
regardless of the quality of the product’s components.100 
Beginning in the 1960s, courts began to apply strict liability to the manu-
facture of non-food items, such as power tools, automobiles, vaccines, and hair 
dyes.101 For example, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., where the 
plaintiff was injured as a result of the malfunction of a power tool, the court 
imposed a strict duty for manufacturers to inspect its products for defects by 
holding that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places 
on the market . . . proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing.”102 
Now that manufacturers may be held strictly liable for injuries caused by 
their products, there is no longer a need to prove the traditional elements of 
                                                        
92  See Byrnes, 887 F. Supp. at 280–81 (citing Cohen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 427 So. 2d 389, 
390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)). 
93  This section only addresses the various duties imposed on a product manufacturer. 
94  Parker v. Allentown, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 2d 773, 780 (D. Md. 2012). 
‘95  C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 524 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D. Ky. 1981); see also 
Fischbach & Moore Int’l Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 632 F.2d 1123, 1127 (4th Cir. 1980). 
96  Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 F.2d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 1985). 
97  MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051–52 (N.Y. 1916). 
98  Id. at 1053. 
99  Id. at 1051. 
100  Id. at 1055. 
101  Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01 (Cal. 1963). 
102  Id. at 900. 
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negligence. Instead, to establish a prima facie case for strict products liability, 
the plaintiff must prove three things: 
(1) [T]hat he was injured by the product; (2) that the product, at the time of the 
accident, was in essentially the same condition as when it left the hands of the 
defendant; and (3) that the injury occurred because the product was in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.103 
Over the years, the courts have set forth various ways of proving these es-
sential elements. 
2.   Bases of Strict Products Liability for Drug Manufacturers 
Manufacturers are generally held liable for injuries caused by products that 
are “defective” or “unreasonably dangerous” to consumers.104 A product is “de-
fective” when it “does not meet the reasonable [safety] expectations of the or-
dinary consumer . . . .”105 A product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it is more 
dangerous than the ordinary consumer with generally available knowledge 
would expect.106 
A prescription drug is defective if, at the time of sale, the drug (1) con-
tained a manufacturing defect; (2) was not safe due to defective design; or (3) 
was not safe due to inadequate warnings or instructions.107 These three bases 
for strict products liability are commonly referred to as “manufacturing defect,” 
“defective design,” or “failure to warn” claims.108 However, a manufacturer is 
not subject to strict liability if the drug was “properly prepared and accompa-
nied by warnings of its dangerous propensities that were either known or rea-
sonably scientifically knowable at the time of distribution.”109 
a.   Manufacturing Defect  
The first way a product can be defective is when it contains a manufactur-
ing defect. A manufacturing defect exists “when the product departs from its 
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation 
and marketing of the product.”110 To establish a claim for a manufacturing de-
fect, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the manufacturer sold the product; (2) the 
manufacturer regularly sold the product; (3) the product “contained a manufac-
turing defect that departed from its intended design” when it left the manufac-
                                                        
103  Madden v. Cox, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985). 
104  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
105  Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Worldwide Equip., Inc. v. Mullins, 11 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999)). 
106  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
107  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
108  See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 251 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
109  Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482–83 (Cal. 1988). 
110  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
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turer’s control; (4) “[t]he manufacturing defect was a proximate cause of plain-
tiff’s damages;” and (5) plaintiff sustained actual damages.111 
Put another way, “a manufacturing defect exists in a product when it leaves 
the hands of the manufacturer in a defective condition because it was not manu-
factured or assembled in accordance with its specifications” and that defective 
condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.112 This 
does not mean that the plaintiff must prove fault on the part of the manufactur-
er,113 only that the manufacturer’s negligence in producing the product must 
have been “a substantial factor in [causing the] plaintiff’s harm.”114 
b.   Defective Design 
In contrast, the second category of strict products liability defects governs 
when the product itself was defectively designed. A drug is defectively de-
signed when “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug . . . are sufficient-
ly great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits . . . .”115 A plaintiff 
may bring a case for design defect by demonstrating that the manufacturer 
“marketed a product designed so that it was not reasonably safe and that the de-
fective design was a substantial factor in causing [the] plaintiff’s injury.”116 If a 
product is defectively designed, it is considered unreasonably dangerous and 
the manufacturer may be held liable for injuries caused by the product, regard-
less of whether it was manufactured as intended.117 Courts employ different 
tests, as explored in the following subsections, to determine whether a product 
is unreasonably dangerous. 
i.   The Reasonable Care Balancing Test 
Some jurisdictions use the reasonable care balancing test, which focuses on 
whether the manufacturer has exercised “that degree of care in [the] plan or de-
sign so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be 
exposed to the danger when the product is used . . . .”118 In performing the rea-
                                                        
111  Estate of Thompson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 922 F. Supp. 2d 780, 789–90 (N.D. 
Iowa 2013). 
112  Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Ky. 1984)). 
113  Id. 
114  Id. (citing King v. Ford Motor Co., 209 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
115  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
116  Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983). 
117  Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272–73 (5th Cir. 1974); see, e.g., Pree v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 983 F.2d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that unguarded propellers are not 
unreasonably dangerous); Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655, 659 (1st Cir. 
1981) (noting that “the absence of proper warnings itself renders a product unreasonably 
dangerous” and holding that some drugs can be unreasonably dangerous). 
118  Kruszka v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 875, 896–97 (D. Minn. 2014) (citation 
omitted). 
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sonable care balancing test, “evidence of the existence of a feasible, alternative 
safer design,” is relevant, but not necessary.119 The reasonable care balancing 
test weighs the relative costs and benefits of an allegedly defective design 
against the relative costs and benefits of either a proposed alternative design, or 
the removal of the challenged product from the market.120 In effect, the reason-
able care balancing test requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that “the world 
would be a better place if the product were either designed differently or taken 
off the market.”121 
ii.   The Risk-Benefit Test 
Other jurisdictions use the “risk-benefit” test, which considers the risks as-
sociated with using a product in the intended and reasonable manner and com-
pares them with the benefits associated with the product’s design.122 If the risks 
of using a product outweigh the expected benefits, it may be unreasonably dan-
gerous. 
Some relevant factors to consider when determining whether the risks out-
weigh the benefits of a product include: (1) the usefulness of the product, both 
to the user and the public as a whole; (2) the likelihood that the product will 
cause injury, and how serious those injuries may be; (3) the availability of safer 
substitute products; (4) the ability of the manufacturer to make the product saf-
er without impairing its usefulness or making it or too expensive; (5) the con-
sumer’s ability to avoid danger by exercising care when using the product; (6) 
the consumer’s awareness of the product’s inherent danger due to general pub-
lic knowledge about the product or the availability of suitable warnings or in-
structions; and (7) the feasibility of the manufacturer “spreading the loss by set-
ting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.”123 
iii.   The Consumer Expectation Test 
The “consumer expectation test” is used to prove design defects by demon-
strating that “the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 
                                                        
119  Id. at 897 (citing Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987)); see, e.g., 
Kapps v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1161 (D. Minn. 2011). 
120  Kapps, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. 
121  Id. 
122  Gumnitsky v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762–63 (N.D. Ohio 2005) 
(citing Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 669–70 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
123  Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 537 (Colo. 1997) (citing Ortho Pharm. Corp. 
v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986), overruled by Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 
175 (Colo. 1992)); see, e.g., Bartholic v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1109 
(D. Colo. 2000) (holding that the risk-benefit test is applicable to all products, not just com-
plex products like vehicles or drugs); Lucas v. City of Visalia, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining that the “risk-benefits test” requires the plaintiff to “allege that 
the risks of the design outweigh the benefits,” and then explain how that design caused the 
plaintiff harm). 
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would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.”124 
Consequently, the jury must determine if they believe “the product meets ordi-
nary expectations as to its safety under the circumstances presented [to the 
plaintiff].”125 Generally, the plaintiff needs only to provide evidence of his use 
of the product, the circumstances surrounding his injury, and the objective 
product features relevant to an evaluation of its safety.126 
c.   Failure to Warn  
The third and final category of strict products liability defects is known as 
“failure to warn,” or those claims that arise from inadequate instructions or 
warnings. Although most consumers believe a manufacturer’s “duty to warn” 
means providing notice of the known risks and side effects to the consumer, the 
manufacturer’s duty extends much further. A prescription drug is not reasona-
bly safe 
if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are 
not provided to: (1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a po-
sition to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warn-
ings; or (2) the patient when the manufacturer knows . . . that health-care pro-
viders will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the 
instructions or warnings.127 
Therefore, the prescribing physician, not the consumer, is the primary party 
the manufacturer must warn about known risks and side effects in order to 
avoid liability under a “failure to warn” theory. Thus, in a claim for inadequate 
warnings, “the issue . . . is whether the warning, if any, that was given to the 
prescribing physicians was proper and adequate.”128 Most claimants bring their 
claim for failure to warn by invoking the learned intermediary rule. The claim-
ants either allege that the manufacturer gave inadequate warnings to the pre-
scribing physician or allege fraud against the manufacturer for making mislead-
ing statements to the consumer. 
                                                        
124  Mariscal v. Graco, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 973, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Barker v. Lull 
Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978)). 
125  Id. at 985 (citing McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002)). 
126  Id. (citing Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 (Cal. 1982)); see, e.g., 
Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 743 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying the consumer expec-
tation test to hold that a consumer is not “entitled to expect a product to perform more safely 
than its government-mandated warnings indicate”); Tran v. Toyota Motor Corp., 420 F.3d 
1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2005) (requiring a jury instruction regarding the consumer expectation 
test to all cases involving products where “an ordinary consumer could form expectations” 
as to its safety, such as seatbelts). 
127  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
128  Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharm., Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1987)). 
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i.   Learned Intermediary Rule 
The manufacturer has a duty to provide warnings to the prescribing physi-
cian because the prescribing physician has a duty “to be fully aware of (1) the 
characteristics of the drug he is prescribing, (2) the amount of the drug which 
can be safely administered, and (3) the different medications the patient is tak-
ing.”129 The prescribing physician also has the duty “to advise the patient of any 
dangers or side effects associated with the use of the drug as well as how and 
when to take the drug.”130  
This duty to warn the prescribing physician is commonly referred to as the 
“learned intermediary rule.”131 “Warnings and instructions with regard to [pre-
scription] drugs . . . are, under the ‘learned intermediary’ rule, directed to 
health-care providers.”132 
Drug manufacturers frequently invoke the learned intermediary rule as an 
exception to their duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions, empha-
sizing that their duty is “to warn physicians about the risks associated with use 
of the drug, and not the consumers of the drug.”133 For example, in Doe v. Sol-
vay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a failure-to-warn claim was dismissed under the 
learned intermediary rule after finding the warnings to the plaintiff’s prescrib-
ing doctor were adequate.134 The rationale is that the prescribing physician acts 
as an intermediary between the manufacturer and consumer and is “generally in 
the best position to evaluate the potential risks and benefits” of taking a drug 
“and to advise the patient accordingly.”135  
ii.   Fraud 
Another, less common way to bring a claim for failure to warn or inade-
quate instructions or warnings is to plead fraud as a natural extension of the 
learned intermediary rule. However, this can often be a challenge because a 
claim for fraud must be pleaded with particularity.136 
For example, in Gainer v. Mylan Bertek Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court 
noted that to bring a claim for fraud, a plaintiff has to show: 
(1) a representation (or concealment where there is a duty to disclose); (2) which 
is material to the transaction; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of or reckless 
disregard as to its falsity; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying 
                                                        
129  Hahn v. Richter, 628 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting Makripodis, 523 A.2d 
at 378). 
130  Id. 
131  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
132  Id. § 6 cmt. e. 
133  Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (D. Vt. 2010). 
134  Doe v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 274 (D. Me. 2004), aff’d, 153 F. App’x 
1 (1st Cir. 2005). 
135  Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1992). 
136  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
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on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or concealment; and (6) 
resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.137 
There, the plaintiff took the generic prescription drug Phenytoin and sub-
sequently developed SJS and TEN.138 In claiming fraud, the plaintiff alleged 
that the manufacturer was aware of the connection between Phenytoin and SJS 
or TEN but that it continued to represent that Phenytoin was safe and failed to 
disclose the connection to the plaintiff’s prescribing physician. 139 The plaintiff 
further stated that the failure to disclose the connection resulted in the prescrib-
ing physician’s inability “to fully assess the risks when making the decision to 
prescribe” Phenytoin, and that the plaintiff “would not have taken Phenytoin if 
she had been warned that it might result in SJS or TEN.” 140 The court reasoned 
that: 
A duty to disclose exists if a “party fails to exercise reasonable care to disclose a 
material fact which may justifiably induce another party to act or refrain from 
acting, and the non-disclosing party knows that the failure to disclose such in-
formation to the other party will render a prior statement or representation un-
true or misleading.”141 
The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently identified the es-
sential elements of fraud and ultimately denied the manufacturer’s motion to 
dismiss.142 
These cases exemplify that courts spent the majority of the twentieth centu-
ry developing and defining the bases of liability available to consumers of de-
fective products. Manufacturer liability expanded from simple negligence to 
strict products liability, with three alternative paths, in which consumers could 
prove that a product was defective. As a result, consumers now have a variety 
of ways to bring their claims, and they have a more direct path of imposing lia-
bility on a manufacturer than was available to previous generations. 
B.   Abolishing Liability for Generic Drug Manufacturers 
In the early part of the twenty-first century, drug manufacturers began 
seeking ways to excuse themselves from liability for drug-induced injuries. 
Many manufacturers rested their attempts on claims of preemption due to the 
plethora of state and federal regulations governing the manufacture and sale of 
drugs. The U.S. Supreme Court validated the manufacturer’s arguments in two 
groundbreaking decisions in 2009 and 2011. The effects of the Court’s deci-
sions meant an endorsement of preemption as a shield for manufacturer liability 
                                                        
137  Gainer v. Mylan Bertek Pharm., Inc., No. 09–690 (JNE/JSM), 2010 WL 2519988, at *2 
(D. Minn. June 15, 2010) (quoting Rose v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 702 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1997)). 
138  Id. at *1. 
139  Id. at *2. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. (quoting Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ohio 1979)). 
142  Id. 
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and still affect injured consumers nationwide, many of whom have lost the 
right to seek recovery for their injuries in a court of law.  
1.   The Slippery Slope of Preemption  
The U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that “ ‘in-
terfere with, or are contrary to,’ federal law.”143 The Supremacy Clause led to 
the creation of the preemption doctrine, under which federal statutes may 
preempt state law.144 More specifically, the doctrine applies in three instances: 
(1) by an express statement from Congress; (2) where the scheme of federal 
regulation creates an inference that Congress did not intend for supplementary 
state regulations; or (3) where the federal interest is so dominant that preemp-
tion of state laws is assumed.145 
Some courts have expressed concern that permitting preemption in some 
cases could “[expand] the scope of preemption to areas of traditional state con-
trol where Congress has not expressed its ‘clear and manifest’ intent to 
preempt.”146 However, even in the absence of express intent by Congress, it is 
assumed that Congress does not intend to take the place of state law,147 and that 
state law is naturally preempted when it conflicts with federal law.148 
In the realm of prescription drugs, preemption means that if a state law im-
poses stricter requirements on a manufacturer than federal law, the manufactur-
er is shielded from liability so long as they are not in violation of applicable 
federal laws. Consequently, drug manufacturers frequently invoke “conflict-
preemption” as a means to escape liability.149 
2.   Two Cases Leading to Preemption of All Claims Against Generic Drug 
Manufacturers 
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a drug manufac-
turer claimed conflict preemption as a means to escape liability.150 This single 
                                                        
143  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 
U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)). 
144  Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1030 (S.D. Ill. 2001). 
145  Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713. 
146  Californians for Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 957 F. Supp. 
1121, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
147  Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1032; see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 
(1981) (“Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that 
Congress did not intend to displace state law.”). 
148  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
149  See, e.g., Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 (dismissing the manufacturer’s claim that it 
was impossible to comply with both the state and federal warning requirements); Gaeta v. 
Perrigo Pharm. Co., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing a claim due to 
preemption of over-the-counter drugs in a failure to warn claim); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 582 
F. Supp. 2d 861, 868–69 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (dismissing a failure to warn claim under conflict 
preemption against generic drug manufacturer). 
150  Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009). 
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case, when combined with a later case, resulted in a pivotal win for the phar-
maceutical industry and took the Court down a slippery slope, which resulted in 
complete insulation from liability for generic manufacturers.  
a.   Case One: Wyeth v. Levine (2009)  
In April, 2000, Diana Levine received a direct IV-push injection of Wy-
eth’s anti-nausea medication Phenergan, which accidentally entered her artery 
due to an unknown reason.151 Levine subsequently developed gangrene and had 
to have her forearm amputated.152 She brought a claim against Wyeth for defec-
tive labeling because it failed to instruct physicians to administer Phenergan 
through an IV-drip administration as opposed to a direct IV-push method of 
administration.153 Wyeth’s defense rested on a claim of conflict pre-emption, 
and the trial court found for the plaintiff because Wyeth did not present suffi-
cient evidence that it “earnestly attempted” to strengthen its label to warn about 
the increased risks associated with intra-arterial injections.154 The trial court al-
so found there was no indication that the FDA had “specifically disallowed” 
stronger language warning that the drug had a serious risk of substantial side 
effects.155 At trial, the jury found that Wyeth was negligent, Phenergan was a 
defective product due to inadequate warnings and instructions, and total dam-
ages were awarded in excess of $7.4 million.156 The Vermont Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the jury’s verdict “did not conflict with FDA’s labeling 
requirements for Phenergan because [Wyeth] could have warned against IV-
push administration without prior FDA approval, and because federal labeling 
requirements create a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation.”157  
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the issue became whether 
the FDA’s drug labeling judgments “preempt state law product liability claims 
premised on the theory that different labeling judgments were necessary to 
make drugs reasonably safe for use.”158 Wyeth argued that the federal laws pro-
hibited it from making stricter label warnings in order to comply with the state 
warning requirements because a unilateral label change would have subjected it 
to sanctions for misbranding.159 The Supreme Court ultimately held that manu-
facturer compliance with federal law, but not state laws requiring stricter label 
warnings, does not insulate a manufacturer from liability.160 In short: it was not 
                                                        
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 1191–92. 
154  Id. at 1192. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. at 1193. 
157  Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 184 (Vt. 2006). 
158  Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1193. 
159  Id. at 1197. 
160  Id. at 1202–03. 
17 NEV.L.J. 429, BRUMFIELD - FINAL.DOCX 4/5/17  11:10 AM 
450 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:429  
impossible for the manufacturer (Wyeth) to comply with both the federal and 
state labeling requirements.161 
b.   Case Two: Pliva v. Mensing (2011)  
Mensing involved two plaintiffs who were prescribed Reglan to treat diges-
tive tract problems, however both received the generic version, metoclo-
pramide, from their respective pharmacies.162 “After taking the drug as pre-
scribed for several years, both [plaintiffs] developed tardive dyskinesia[,]” a 
severe neurological disorder, which causes involuntary body movements.163 
Both plaintiffs sued the generic manufacturers, claiming failure to provide ade-
quate warnings, as the manufacturers were aware of the mounting evidence of a 
significant risk of tardive dyskinesia from ingesting metoclopramide yet failed 
to increase the drug’s warning labels.164 The manufacturers raised a preemption 
defense and insisted that compliance with both the FDA’s requirement to have 
a label identical to that of the brand name manufacturer and the increased warn-
ings required by state law was impossible.165  
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the manufacturers: 
Here, state law imposed a duty on the Manufacturers to take a certain action, and 
federal law barred them from taking that action. The only action the Manufac-
turers could independently take—asking for the FDA’s help—is not a matter of 
state-law concern. [The plaintiffs’] tort claims are pre-empted.166 
The plaintiffs argued that the manufacturers could have utilized “Dear 
Doctor” letters to independently warn prescribing physicians of the increased 
risk of tardive dyskinesia.167 This argument also failed, as the Court deferred to 
the FDA’s assertion that “Dear Doctor” letters are treated the same as labels, so 
the generic manufacturers could not issue their own letters.168 
The combined decisions of Wyeth and Pliva shook the foundation of the 
products liability world, resulting in near immunity for generic drug manufac-
turers and making “access to the courts . . . dependent on whether an individual 
                                                        
161  Id. at 1204. 
162  Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2573 (2011). 
163  Id.; see also Tardive Dyskinesia, NAT’L ALLIANCE MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.na 
mi.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-Conditions/Related-Conditions/Tardive-Dyskinesia [http 
s://perma.cc/3EZC-7WD5] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
164  Pliva, 131 S. Ct. at 2573. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. at 2581. 
167  Pliva, 131 S. Ct. at 2576. “A “Dear Doctor” letter is a common name for a Dear Health 
Care Professional (DHCP) letter, which is “intended to alert physicians and other health care 
providers about important new or updated information” about a drug. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEAR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LETTERS 1 (2014). 
The FDA recommends that manufacturers issue DHCP letters when an important safety con-
cern “could affect the decision to use a drug or require some change in behavior by health 
care providers . . . to reduce the potential for harm from a drug.” Id. at 3. 
168  Pliva, 131 S. Ct. at 2576. 
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is dispensed a brand name or generic drug.”169 The FDA has even remarked 
that the Mensing decision lessens the incentive for generic drug manufacturers 
to comply with FDA requirements to conduct post-marketing surveillance, 
evaluation, and reporting, and to provide current and accurate drug labels.170 
3.   Mensing applied: Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett (2013)  
Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mensing, generic drug manu-
facturers were just as susceptible to products liability claims as their brand 
name counterparts.171 However, since Mensing in 2011, federal preemption has 
insulated generic drug manufacturers from virtually all products liability 
claims. This new wave of federal preemption claims manifested in the 2013 
case, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett.172 
Karen Bartlett was prescribed the prescription drug Cinoril for shoulder 
pain, but the pharmacist dispensed her the generic version, Sulindac.173 After 
using Sulindac, Ms. Bartlett developed toxic epidermal necrolysis, with burns 
covering over 60 percent of her body.174 “[Ms. Bartlett] spent months in a med-
ically induced coma, underwent [twelve] eye surgeries, and was tube-fed for a 
year.”175 
When Bartlett ingested Sulindac, the label warned only about “severe skin 
reactions and fatalities.”176 The next year, the FDA recommended that the 
Cinoril label change to explicitly warn about toxic epidermal necrolysis.177 Ms. 
Bartlett brought suit under the theories of failure-to-warn and design defect, ul-
timately receiving a jury award of over $21 million in damages for her design 
                                                        
169  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bio-
logical Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,988 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 314, 601). 
170  Id. at 67,989. 
171  See, e.g., Munroe v. Barr Labs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (not-
ing that “[n]othing in federal law . . . suggests that a generic manufacturer should be exempt 
from the same liability that the brand manufacturer faces for any design defect or failure to 
warn.”); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1265 (W.D. Okla. 2009), aff’’d, 727 
F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2013) (denying generic drug manufacturer’s motion to dismiss failure-
to-warn claims on federal preemption grounds); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 421, 436 
(D. Vt. 2008) (same). 
172  Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
173  Id. at 2472. 
174  Id. at 2472. Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN) is 
an especially severe form of Stevens Johnson Syndrome (SJS), a rare but life-threatening disease 
that causes severe blistering and sloughing off of skin, together with serious damage to the 
mouth, eyes, throat, and esophagus. Treatment for the disease is similar to that given burn vic-
tims, as the separation of the top layer of skin from the deeper layers of skin, is akin to a second-
degree or partial-thickness burn. 
Maya v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 A.3d 1203, 1209–10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). 
175  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
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defect claim.178 The appellate court affirmed the verdict, holding that the manu-
facturer could comply with both state and federal law by choosing not to pro-
duce the drug.179 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this approach, relying on “a 
straightforward application of preemption law” and reversed the jury award, 
leaving Ms. Bartlett without recourse, simply because she ingested the generic 
version of Cinoril.180 In the Court’s closing remarks, Justice Alito lamented 
“Congress’ decision to regulate the manufacture and sale of generic drugs in a 
way that reduces their cost to patients but leaves generic drug manufacturers 
incapable of modifying either the drugs’ compositions or their warnings.”181 
In contrast, claims against brand name manufacturers may still proceed. 
For example, in Maya v. Johnson & Johnson, the Superior Court of Pennsylva-
nia affirmed a $10-million verdict for a young girl who suffered from toxic ep-
idermal necrolysis after ingesting two brand-name over-the-counter drugs.182 
Three days after three-year old Brianna Maya’s mother gave her doses of Chil-
dren’s Motrin and Children’s Tylenol to fight a fever, Brianna was diagnosed 
with TEN, requiring a sixteen day stay in a children’s burn unit, and suffered 
severe eye damage.183 As a result of her injuries, Brianna had to endure sixteen 
eye surgeries and make lifestyle changes such as avoiding strenuous activity 
“due to her inability to perspire normally, pulmonary fibrosis, and . . . scarring 
in the lungs which [made] respiration difficult and increase[d] the risk of asth-
matic attacks and upper respiratory infections.”184 Additionally, she suffered so 
much damage to her reproductive system that she may never be able to natural-
ly bear children.185 Following a nine-week jury trial, the jury awarded a $10-
million verdict against McNeil, the manufacturer of Children’s Motrin, for neg-
ligent failure to warn under applicable state law.186 
III.   PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR CHANGE  
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mensing, the legal community 
began to contemplate how to fix this new gap in manufacturer liability. They 
                                                        
178  Id. 
179  Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co. Inc., 678 F.3d 30, 44 (1st Cir. 2012). 
180  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480. 
181  Id. 
182  Maya v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 A.3d 1203, 1211, 1225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). 
183  Id. at 1208–10. 
184  Id. at 1210. 
185  Id. at 1211. 
186  Id.; see also Rowland v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 34 F. Supp. 3d 556, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2014) 
(denying brand name manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment and allowing case to 
proceed for failure to warn claim); Amos v. Biogen Idec Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170 
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying brand name manufacturer’s motion to dismiss and allowing case 
to proceed for strict liability for negligent failure to warn); Frazier v. Mylan Inc., 911 F. 
Supp. 2d 1285, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (denying brand name manufacturer’s motion to dis-
miss and allowing case to proceed under bases of failure to warn and strict liability for defec-
tive design). 
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focused on those FDA regulations which allow generic drug manufacturers to 
assume minimal liability as compared to the brand name manufacturers.187 The 
current state of the U.S. health care system, where insurance companies control 
which prescriptions may be filled and where pharmacies fill generic prescrip-
tions by default, has created a sense of urgency to once again hold generic drug 
manufacturers liable for injuries caused by their products. Requiring all manu-
facturers, generic and brand-name, to adequately warn consumers of potential 
adverse events, would ensure they are held liable. Should the FDA change its 
current regulations to allow generic manufacturers to make label changes with 
increased warnings without waiting for brand name manufacturer approval, ge-
neric manufacturers would no longer be able to hide in the shadows of their 
brand name counterparts.188 Without such a change in the FDA’s regulations, 
injured consumers are left to the mercy of their insurance companies and phar-
macies to dictate whether or not they have a right to relief in a court of law. 
A.   Changes within the Food and Drug Administration 
The FDA has the ability to amend its regulations to either strengthen or 
weaken requirements for drug manufacturers. However, before doing so, the 
FDA must engage in formal rulemaking, receive comments from interested par-
ties and provide the opportunity for an oral hearing.189 
1.   Petitions for Rulemaking  
On August 29, 2011, Public Citizen submitted a petition for formal rule-
making, urging the FDA to allow generic drug manufacturers to independently 
revise their prescription labels.190 The petition also requested that the FDA al-
low generic drug manufacturers’ labels to differ from the labels of the brand 
name equivalents without withdrawing ANDA approval.191 Finally, the petition 
                                                        
187  See, e.g., James M. Beck, Two Firsts in Post-Mensing Litigation, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2011, 
3:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/291541/two-firsts-in-post-mensing-litigation 
[https://perma.cc/KRF6-T9PJ]; Kelly Savage Day & Michael Healy, From the Experts: 




188  See generally Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to 
Sidney M. Wolfe, Dir., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., Allison M. Zieve, Dir., Pub. Citi-
zen Litig. Grp., & Brian Wolfman, Co-Dir., Inst. of Pub. Representation, (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/2169.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q92T-8YGB]. 
189  21 U.S.C. § 360j(f)(1)(B) (2012). 
190  Petition from Pub. Citizen to U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/1965.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9MM-EYAQ] [hereinafter 
Public Citizen Petition]. Public Citizen is a non-profit advocacy group which represents citi-
zen’s interests in Washington D.C. See About Us, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/ 
Page.aspx?pid=2306 [https://perma.cc/R8MD-RL5X] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
191  Public Citizen Petition, supra note 190. 
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requested that the FDA make all manufacturers independently responsible for 
reporting safety concerns to the FDA.192 
2.   The Food and Drug Administration’s Response  
As courts continued to shield generic manufacturers from liability, the 
FDA received several notices from concerned organizations like Public Citizen 
and was reminded of the Supreme Court’s prompting that the “FDA retain[s] 
the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire.”193 On No-
vember 8, 2013, the FDA granted the numerous petitions for formal rulemaking 
and opened the subject for public notice and comments.194 Specifically, the 
FDA announced a proposed rule, which would allow generic drug manufactur-
ers to independently change their prescription labels to reflect “newly acquired 
safety-related information in advance of FDA’s review of the change.”195 
Furthermore, the proposed regulation would make new labels immediately 
available online for the public to view and would also establish a procedure 
whereby all generic manufacturers must change their labels to mirror the 
change of another manufacturer within thirty days, even if that other manufac-
turer is not the brand name manufacturer.196 The time for the FDA to receive 
comments to its proposed rule expired on March 13, 2014.197 Now, the nation 
waits to see if the FDA will enact the rule and allow generic manufacturers to 
be liable for injuries caused by its drugs. 
B.   Effects of the United States Health Care System on Consumer Rights  
Currently, the law only bars consumers from bringing claims against ge-
neric drug manufacturers. However, the number of Americans affected by this 
constraint is rapidly growing due to federal legislation mandating health insur-
ance, insurance companies restricting which drugs consumers can take, and 
state laws requiring pharmacies to fill prescriptions with generics when availa-
ble. 
                                                        
192  Id. 
193  Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2568 (2011). 
194  Letter from Janet Woodcock, supra note 188. 
195  Id. (citation omitted); see also Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes 
for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,986 (proposed Nov. 
13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601). 
196  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bio-
logical Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67,986. 
197  Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bio-
logical Products; Correction and Extension of Comment Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,796, 78,796 
(proposed Dec. 27, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601). 
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1.   The Affordable Care Act Requires All Americans to Carry Health 
Insurance 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”) 
requires that all Americans maintain minimum essential health insurance cov-
erage.198 Part of the Affordable Care Act’s requirement for minimum coverage 
is “essential health benefits,” including coverage for prescription drugs.199 The 
penalty for not enrolling in a qualified health insurance plan is to pay a percent-
age of income equaling 1 percent for 2014, 2 percent for 2015, and 2.5 percent 
for all years after 2015.200 The percentage of uninsured Americans had dropped 
from approximately 18 percent at the end of 2013 just before the Affordable 
Care Act went into effect to 11.9 percent after the first quarter of 2015.201 
Despite the penalty for not enrolling in a qualified plan, some Americans 
are choosing that option.202 This is due in part to the high cost of premiums and 
deductibles when compared to the income of individuals.203 Without insurance 
coverage, some facilities will not see patients, and patients have to pay all costs 
out of their own pockets, yet even these out-of-pocket costs are less than the 
cost of coverage for many Americans.204 Indeed, some consumers have indicat-
ed they would be more likely to sign up for a qualified plan if the penalty were 
higher.205 
2.   Most Insurance Companies Force Patients to Take Generic 
Prescriptions  
Even among those with insurance plans, more and more Americans are 
finding that many of their prescriptions are not covered by their insurance plans 
leaving the consumers to pay for their prescriptions out of their own pockets.206 
Insurance plans vary: while some may not provide coverage for a particular 
drug, others may, and different plans may require different co-pays for the 
                                                        
198  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012). 
199  42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(F) (2012). 
200  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
201  Jenna Levy, In U.S., Uninsured Rate Dips to 11.9% in First Quarter, GALLUP (Apr. 13, 
2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182348/uninsured-rate-dips-first-quarter.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/5LSD-F4AT]. 
202  See, e.g., Carl Gibson, Why I’m Choosing to Pay $300 to Stay Uninsured, READER 
SUPPORTED NEWS (Dec. 24, 2013), http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/272-39/21144-
why-im-choosing-to-pay-300-to-stay-uninsured [https://perma.cc/6C55-NP8Y]. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. 
205  Charlie Richter & Stafford Nichols, Higher Fines Compel Uninsured Americans to Sign 
Up, GALLUP (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/168542/higher-fines-compel-un 
insured-americans-sign.aspx [https://perma.cc/228B-UQ2P]. 
206  See Scott Gottlieb, No, You Can’t Keep Your Drugs Either Under Obamacare, FORBES 
(Dec. 9, 2013, 7:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/2013/12/09/no-you-cant-
keep-your-drugs-either-under-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/T4EK-GRAX]. 
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same prescription.207 Due to the disparity in out-of-pocket costs for brand name 
versus generic drugs (30 to 80 percent savings), many consumers have no 
choice but to purchase the generic versions, especially because their insurance 
companies will only allow them to purchase generics.208 
3.   Pharmacies Are Required by Law to Fill Prescriptions with Generic 
Equivalents 
Additionally, many states have enacted laws “requir[ing] pharmacists to 
automatically substitute the generic version [of a drug] when available, unless 
the doctor has specifically noted otherwise.”209 Some states provide that the 
pharmacist does not have to notify the consumer when substituting a generic 
drug for the brand name, though some states do require that the pharmacist ask 
permission first.210 
For example, in Nevada, pharmacists have the discretion to substitute a less 
expensive generic drug for a brand name prescription unless the prescribing 
physician prohibits substitution or the consumer refuses the substitution.211 In 
contrast, California pharmacists have this same discretion unless the prescrip-
tion bears the words “do not substitute,” but they do not have to notify the con-
sumer.212 
Thus, the current set up of the U.S. health care system provides an overall 
scheme, which has curtailed the rights of many Americans. Americans are now 
required to carry health insurance, or face a monetary penalty. Insurance com-
panies restrict which prescriptions consumers can purchase, and pharmacies au-
tomatically fill prescriptions with generics. As a result, many Americans have 
no choice but to take generic drugs, and thereby lose their rights to redress in a 
court of law when they suffer injuries because of those drugs. 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of the FDA’s authority has expanded greatly over the past centu-
ry, allowing it to promulgate regulations to ensure the safety, efficacy, and 
honest labeling of all prescription drugs. Similarly, the FDA has also provided 
a way to allow consumers to have access to less-expensive versions of pharma-
ceuticals, while also providing a time period for manufacturers to recoup their 
investment costs for developing new drugs. Just as the FDA’s scope of authori-
ty has expanded, the courts have also broadened the ways manufacturers can be 
                                                        
207  Id. 
208  Chris Woolston & Stephen Levine, Generic Drugs, HEALTHDAY, http://consumer.health 
day.com/encyclopedia/drug-center-16/misc-drugs-news-218/generic-drugs-646396.html 
[https://perma.cc/5V3Q-2B3V] (last updated Jan. 20, 2016). 
209  Id. 
210  Id. 
211  NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.2583 (1), (3) (2016). 
212  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4073 (West 2016). 
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held liable when their products harm consumers. However, the current regula-
tory scheme is vulnerable to claims of preemption, resulting in generic drug 
manufacturers being virtually immune from suit. 
Current proposed regulations would change this regulatory scheme by al-
lowing generic manufacturers to increase warnings on their drug labels without 
waiting for approval from their brand-name counterparts. Should the FDA fail 
to adopt the proposed regulations, countless Americans would be stripped of 
their rights to pursue litigation for claims of negligence against generic drug 
manufacturers who introduce their drugs to market but fail to provide adequate 
warnings of safety concerns. This danger is amplified further because of the 
amount of control and discretion insurance companies and pharmacies have 
over which drugs are covered and dispensed to consumers. The legal landscape 
needs to continue to evolve so that consumers are able to make informed choic-
es about their prescriptions, and that all manufacturers are held responsible for 
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